Cheltenham Borough Council

Cabinet – 6th December 2016

Council – 12th December 2016

Treasury Mid-Term Report 2016/17

Accountable member	**Finance, Rowena Hay**
Accountable officer	**Section 151 Officer, Paul Jones**
Accountable scrutiny	**Treasury Management Panel**
Ward(s) affected	**None**
Key Decision	**Yes**
Executive summary	The Treasury Management Strategy for 2016/17 has been determined by the adoption of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management 2009 (revised 2011), which includes the requirement for determining a treasury strategy on the likely financing and investment activity for the forthcoming financial year. The Code also recommends that members are informed of Treasury Management activities at least twice a year. This report therefore ensures this authority has adopted the code and complies with its requirements.
Consultation	The Treasury Management Panel considered this report on 14th November 2016.
Recommendations	**Treasury Management Panel approves the following recommendation to Cabinet/Council:** **1. Note the contents of the summary report of the treasury management activity during the first six months of 2016/17.**

Financial implications	All financial implications are detailed throughout the report **Contact officer: Andrew Sherbourne, andrew.sherbourne@cheltenham.gov.uk, 01242 264337**
Legal implications	None specific arising from the report recommendations. **Contact officer: Peter Lewis, peter.lewis@tewkesbury.gov.uk, 01242 264216**

HR implications (including learning and organisational development)	No direct HR implications arising from this report **Contact officer: Julie McCarthy, julie.mccarthy@cheltenham.gov.uk. 01242 264355**
Key risks	see appendix 2
Corporate and community plan Implications	None
Environmental and climate change implications	None

1. Background

1.1 The Treasury Management Strategy for 2016/17 has been developed by the adoption of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management 2009 (revised 2011), which includes the requirement for determining a treasury strategy on the likely financing and investment activity for the forthcoming financial year. The Code also recommends that members are informed of Treasury Management activities at least twice a year. This report therefore ensures this authority has adopted the code and complies with its requirements, one of which is the provision of a Mid-year report to Members.

1.2 The Council operates a balanced budget, which broadly means cash raised during the year will meet its cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operations ensure this cash flow is adequately planned, with surplus monies being invested in low risk counterparties, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering optimising investment return. The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the Council can meet its capital spending operations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses, and on occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

Accordingly, treasury management is defined as:

"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

2. Economic update for the first six months

2.1 The following key points have been provided by the councils Treasury Advisors, Capita Treasury Solutions.

2.2 During most of 2015, the economy had faced headwinds for exporters from the appreciation during the year of sterling against the Euro, and weak growth in the EU, China and emerging markets, plus the dampening effect of the Government's continuing austerity programme. The referendum vote for Brexit in June this year delivered an immediate shock fall in confidence indicators and business surveys, pointing to an impending sharp slowdown in the economy. However, subsequent surveys have shown a sharp recovery in confidence and business surveys, though it is generally expected that although the economy will now avoid flat lining, growth will be weak through the second half of 2016 and in 2017.

2.3 The Bank of England meeting on August 4th addressed this expected slowdown in growth by a package of measures including a cut in Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%. The Inflation Report included an unchanged forecast for growth for 2016 of 2.0% but cut the forecast for 2017 from 2.3% to just 0.8%. The Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, had warned that a vote for Brexit would be likely to cause a slowing in growth, particularly from a reduction in business investment, due to the uncertainty of whether the UK would have continuing full access, (i.e. without tariffs), to the EU single market. He also warned that the Bank could not do all the heavy lifting and suggested that the Government will need to help growth by increasing investment expenditure and possibly by using fiscal policy tools (taxation). The new Chancellor Phillip Hammond announced after the referendum result, that the target of achieving a budget surplus in 2020 will be eased in the Autumn Statement on November 23.

2.4 The Inflation Report also included a sharp rise in the forecast for inflation to around 2.4% in 2018 and 2019. CPI has started rising during 2016 as the falls in the price of oil and food twelve months ago fall out of the calculation during the year and, in addition, the post referendum 10% fall in the value of sterling on a trade weighted basis is likely to result in a 3% increase in CPI over a time period of 3-4 years. However, the MPC is expected to overlook this upward blip from this devaluation of sterling in order to support economic growth, especially if pay increases continue to remain subdued and therefore pose little danger of stoking core inflationary price pressures within the UK economy.

2.5 The American economy had a patchy 2015 with sharp swings in the growth rate leaving the overall growth for the year at 2.4%. Quarter 1 of 2016 disappointed at +0.8% on an annualised basis while quarter 2 improved, but only to a lacklustre +1.4%. However, forward indicators are pointing towards a pickup in growth in the rest of 2016. The American Federal Bank embarked on its long anticipated first increase in rates at its December 2015 meeting. At that point, confidence was high that there would then be four more increases to come in 2016. Since then, more downbeat news on the international scene and then the Brexit vote, have caused a delay in the timing of the second increase which is now strongly expected in December this year.

2.6 In the Eurozone, the ECB commenced in March 2015 its massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries at a rate of €60bn per month; this was intended to run initially to September 2016 but was extended to March 2017 at its December 2015 meeting. At its December and March meetings it progressively cut its deposit facility rate to reach -0.4% and its main refinancing rate from 0.05% to zero. At its March meeting, it also increased its monthly asset purchases to €80bn. These measures have struggled to make a significant impact in boosting economic growth and in helping inflation to rise from around zero towards the target of 2%. GDP growth rose by 0.6% in quarter 1 2016 (1.7% y/y) but slowed to +0.3% (+1.6% y/y) in quarter 2. This has added to comments from many forecasters that central banks around the world are running out of ammunition to stimulate economic growth and to boost inflation. They stress that national governments will need to do more by way of structural reforms, fiscal measures and direct investment expenditure to support demand in the their economies and economic growth.

3. Portfolio position 1/4/2016 to 30/9/2016

Movements in the Council's borrowing during the first six months of 2016/17 financial year can be seen in the table below. Long term loans are deemed to be those repayable over a period of more than one year.

Source of Loan Temporary Borrowing	Balance at 1 April 2016 £	Raised during Apr-Sept £	Repaid during Apr-Sept £	Balance at 30 Sept 2016 £
Local Authority	0	1,000,000	1,000,000	0
Temporary Investment	21,000	0	0	0
Total Short Term Borrowing	**21,000**	**1,000,000**	**1,000,000**	**21,000**
Long Term Borrowing				
- Public Works Loan Board	49,459,478	0	263,098	49,196,380
- Market Loans	15,900,000	0	0	15,900,000
Long Term Borrowing	**65,359,478**	**0**	**263,098**	**65,096,380**
Total External Borrowing	**65,380,478**	**1,000,000**	**1, 263,098**	**65,117,380**

3.1 In February 2016 the Council's borrowing costs for 2016/17 was budgeted to be £2,115,800 and this is expected to come in at £2,121,893, an overspend of £6,093. The small increase estimated is in respect of what the General Fund needs to pay the HRA for the reserves and balances held within the council investment balances. These balances are expected to come in higher than what was estimated in February 2016.

3.2 The Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) remains an attractive source of borrowing for the Council as it offers flexibility and control. No long term borrowing has occurred yet and it is very likely that no borrowing will be undertaken in this financial year.

3.3 Debt rescheduling opportunities have been very limited in the current economic climate given the consequent structure of interest rates, and following the increase in the margin added to gilt yields which has impacted PWLB new borrowing rates since October 2010. No debt rescheduling has therefore been undertaken to date in the current financial year.

4. Investments

The DCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments in England gives priority to security and liquidity and the Council's aim is to achieve a yield commensurate with these principles.

Security of capital remained the Council's main investment objective. This was maintained by following the Council's counterparty policy as set out in its Treasury Management Strategy for 2016/17 approved by Council on the 12th February 2016. This restricted new investment to the following:-

Investment	**Max Sum per institution/group**	**Maximum period**
Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility* (DMADF) • this facility is at present available for investments up to 6 months	UNLIMITED	6 months
UK Government Gilts	£2m	2 years
UK Government Treasury Bills	UNLIMITED	1 year
Term deposits with the UK government or with UK local authorities (i.e. local authorities as defined under Section 23 of the 2003 Act) with maturities up to 1 year	£7m	unlimited
Term deposits with credit-rated deposit takers (banks and building societies), including callable deposits, with maturities up to 1 year (UK & Non-UK)	£7m	1 year
Money Market Funds with UK/Ireland/Luxembourg domiciled	£2m	1 year
Corporate Bonds held in a broker's nominee account (King & Shaxson Ltd)	£2m	2 years to maturity
T-Bills issued by the DMO (Government)	UNLIMITED	1 year
Certificates of deposit (CD's) & Bonds issued by banks and building societies covered by UK Government (explicit) guarantee	£7m	2 years

This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Capita. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;

- Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

4.1 It is a very difficult investment market in terms of earning the level of interest rates commonly seen in previous decades as rates are very low and in line with the 0.25% Bank Rate. The continuing potential for a re-emergence of a Eurozone sovereign debt crisis together with other risks which could impact on the creditworthiness of banks, prompts a low risk strategy. Given this risk environment, investment returns are likely to remain low.

4.2 **Investments -** Movements in the Council's investment portfolio during the first six months of 2016/17 can be seen in the table below.

Source of Loan **Short term Lending**	**Balance at 1 April 2016 £**	**Raised during Apr-Sept £**	**Repaid during Apr-Sept £**	**Balance at 30 Sept 2016 £**
Bank – Term Deposit	9,000,000	9,000,000	10,000,000	8,000,000
Building Societies	5,300,000	5,300,000	5,300,000	5,300,000
Call A/C's	3,660,000	68,405,000	62,145,000	9,920,000
Glos Airport Ltd	140,000	0	35,000	105,000
Money Market Funds	2,000,000	8,300,000	6,300,000	4,000,000
Total Short Term Lending	**20,100,000**	**91,005,000**	**83,780,000**	**27,325,000**
Icelandic Banks in administration	**Balance at 1 April 2016 £**	**Raised during Apr-Sept £**	**Repaid during the year £**	**Balance at 30 Sept 2016 £**
- Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander	484,986	0	0	484,986
- Glitnir	572,400	0	572,400	0
Total Icelandic Banks	**1,057,386**	**0**	**572,400**	**484,986**
Total External Investments	**21,157,386**	**91,005,000**	**84,352,400**	**27,809,986**

4.3 In February 2016 the Council's Investment income for 2016/17 was budgeted to be £123,200. The average cash balances representing the council's reserves and working balances, was £23.575m during the period this report covers. The Council anticipates an investment outturn of £130,000 at a rate of 0.50% for this financial year as treasury officers have been able to gain some good rates with the Bonds and Certificate of Deposits purchased. Security of capital has remained the Council's main investment objective. This has been maintained by following the Council's counterparty policy as set out in its Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2016/17.

4.4 Included within the investments of £27.810m as at 30th September 2016, the Council has £485km deposited in the collapsed Icelandic bank Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander.

4.5 In June 2016 the council participated in an auction to sell its Icelandic Krona's held in an escrow account in relation to Glitnir, to the Central Bank of Iceland, who then repaid the monies back in Euro's. The timing of receiving the Euro's into the council's bank account in sterling was favourable as the monies were received after the Brexit Referendum which had a big impact on the exchange rate, resulting in the council receiving £627,856 on the 4th July 2016. The Council has no further monies outstanding with Glitnir now.

4.6 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander administrators have made distributions of 83.75p in the pound to date. Administrators currently estimate a total return of 85p-86.5p in the pound. No future date for the next dividend payment has been set yet.

5. Prudential Indicators

5.1 During the financial year to date the Council has operated within the treasury limits and Prudential Indicators set out in the Council's Treasury Policy Statement and Annual Treasury Strategy Statement. Appendix 1 attached highlights the major indicators.

6. Outlook

	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19
Bank rate	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.50%
5yr PWLB rate	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.10%	1.10%	1.10%	1.20%	1.20%	1.20%	1.20%	1.30%
10yr PWLB rate	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%
25yr PWLB rate	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%
50yr PWLB rate	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.20%	2.20%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%

6.1 Capita Asset Services undertook a quarterly review of its interest rate forecasts after the MPC meeting of 4th August cut Bank Rate to 0.25% and gave forward guidance that it expected to cut Bank Rate again to near zero before the year end. The above forecast therefore includes a further cut to 0.10% in November this year and a first increase in May 2018, to 0.25%, but no further increase to 0.50% until a year later. Mark Carney has repeatedly stated that increases in Bank Rate will be slow and gradual after they do start. The MPC is concerned about the impact of increases on many heavily indebted consumers, especially when the growth in average disposable income is still weak and could well turn negative when inflation rises during the next two years to exceed average pay increases.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. An eventual world economic recovery may also see investors switching from the safe haven of bonds to equities. However, we have been experiencing exceptional levels of volatility in financial markets which have caused significant swings in PWLB rates. Our PWLB rate forecasts are based on the Certainty Rate (minus 20 bps) which has been accessible to most authorities since 1st November 2012.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK remains to the downside. Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Monetary policy action reaching its limit of effectiveness and failing to stimulate significant sustainable growth, combat the threat of deflation and reduce high levels of debt in some major developed economies, combined with a lack of adequate action from national governments to promote growth through structural reforms, fiscal policy and investment expenditure.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Geopolitical risks in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, increasing safe haven flows.
- Emerging country economies, currencies and corporates destabilised by falling commodity prices and / or Fed. rate increases, causing a further flight to safe havens (bonds).
- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US.

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

7. Performance management

7.1 In compliance with the requirements of the Treasury Management CIPFA Code of

Practice this report provides members with a summary report of the treasury management activity during the first six months of 2016/17. None of the Prudential Indicators have been breached and a prudent approach has been taken in relation to investment activity with priority being given to security and liquidity over yield.

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Appendices	Prudential Indicators Appendix 1 Risk Appendix 2
Background information	Treasury Management Strategy, Council 12th February 2016